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In this study, we examine whether and how internal control over financial reporting affects firm 
operational efficiency. We find that operational efficiency, derived from the frontier analysis, is 
significantly lower among firms with material weaknesses in internal control relative to firms 
without such weaknesses. We document some evidence suggesting that effective internal control 
leads to greater operational efficiency through reducing the likelihood of misappropriation of 
corporate resources and through enhancing the quality of internal reports for decision making. 
We also document that smaller firms benefit more from having effective internal control in terms 
of operational efficiency. In addition, we find that the market appears to understand the effect of 
ineffective internal control on operational efficiency: within firms with internal control material 
weakness, those with more negative market reaction experience a larger deterioration in 
operational efficiency. Lastly, we find that the firms that remediate their material weaknesses 
subsequently experience an improvement in operating performance and stock returns, and this 
effect is mainly driven by the improvement in operational efficiency.  Overall, our study extends 
the literature by presenting systematic evidence on the effects of effective internal control on 
operational efficiency and firm performance. 
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Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404) requires companies’ auditors to 
provide an opinion on their clients’ internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), in addition 
to the opinion on their clients’ financial statements. Since its effective date, SOX 404 has been 
subject to intense debate. Many critics argue that its perceived benefits are not commensurate 
with the high compliance costs (Michaels 2003; DeFond and Francis 2005; Powell 2005; 
Romano 2005). While studies have documented the benefits of effective ICFR, such as better 
financial reporting quality and lower cost of capital,1 the high compliance costs have led to the 
permanent exemption of non-accelerated filers under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in July 2010.2 These developments after the implementation of SOX 
404 suggest that it is still important to examine the costs and benefits of maintaining effective 
internal control.  
In this study, we examine the effect of ICFR on firm operational efficiency. Our 
examination is important not only because it contributes to the continuous debate on the costs 
and benefits of SOX 404, but also because it sheds light on the implications of internal control 
beyond financial reporting. The Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (2013) explicitly states 
that one of the objectives of internal control pertains to the “effectiveness and efficiency of the 
                                                 
1 For examples, see Doyle et al. (2007a) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) on the effect of internal control on 
financial reporting quality, and Ogneva et al. (2007), Beneish et al. (2008), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011), and Kim et al. (2011) on the effect of internal control on the cost of capital. 
2 For example, CRA International’s (2005) survey indicates that the total year-one Section 404 implementation cost 
is $1.5 million per company with market capitalization between $75 million and $700 million, or 0.46 percent of its 
revenue, and is $7.3 million per company with market capitalization above $700 million, or 0.09 percent of its 
revenue. Financial Executives International (2004) arrives at a similar conclusion from its surveys. It estimated that 
the average year-one 404 compliance cost is over $3 million per company, and over $8 million for companies with 
more than $5 billion in revenues. Eldridge and Kealey (2005) document that audit fees as a percentage of total assets 
more than doubled following the enactment of SOX, and that small companies reported larger increases. 
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entity’s operations, including operational and financial performance goals, and safeguarding 
assets against loss.”3 However, despite its importance, there is limited research on the effect of 
internal control on operational efficiency.4  
We expect ineffective internal control to have a negative effect on firm operational 
efficiency for two non-exclusive reasons. First, ineffective internal control leads to greater 
information risk, which increases agency problems and the likelihood of misappropriation of 
corporate resources by managers and other employees (Lambert et al. 2007). In addition, 
ineffective internal control in the form of inadequate physical security, inadequate segregation of 
duties, and inadequate documentation further allows the misappropriation of resources by 
employees. If resources available for production are diverted for managers’ and other 
employees’ personal consumption, the outputs generated for a given amount of inputs will be 
reduced, leading to lower operational efficiency. Second, ineffective internal control can result in 
erroneous internal management reports and untimely financial reporting information (Feng et al. 
2009). Managers relying on such reports are more likely to make suboptimal operational 
decisions, leading to inefficiencies such as inventory obsolescence, increased inventory storage 
costs, and/or idle capacity. This can lead to higher input costs incurred for a given amount of 
outputs and hence lower operational efficiency. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, there are two reasons why we might not observe the 
                                                 
3 This framework replaces the previous one issued in 1992, which defines internal control as "the process designed, 
implemented and maintained to provide reasonable assurance about the achievement of an entity's objectives with 
regard to (a) reliability of financial reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of operation, (c) safeguarding of assets 
and (d) compliance with applicable laws and regulations (emphasis added).” Furthermore, Statement of Auditing 
Standards No. 115, Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit, defines internal control 
as “a process—effected by those charged with governance, management, and other personnel—designed to provide 
reasonable assurance about the achievement of the entity's objectives with regard to the reliability of financial 
reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations (emphasis 
added).” 
4 The exceptions are the two recent studies that examine the effect of internal control effectiveness on firms’ 
investment efficiency (Cheng et al. 2013) and inventory management (Feng et al. 2013). Below we provide more 
detailed discussion of these studies and how our study differs from them. 
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hypothesized negative association between ineffective internal control and operational 
efficiency. First, because the intended objective of SOX 404 is to improve the reliability of 
firms’ financial reporting (PCAOB 2004; Donaldson 2005) and to help external users make 
better decisions, few have envisaged the potential benefits of internal control for internal 
operations. According to the survey reported in Alexander et al. (2013), many managers do not 
believe that effective internal control can improve the quality of internal reports. If this is the 
case, the hypothesized benefits of effective internal control on operational efficiency may not 
materialize. Second, internal control is a process that involves human diligence and compliance 
and, hence, is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns resulting from human failures. It 
also can be circumvented by collusion or improper management override (AICPA 2005; SEC 
2007). To the extent that internal control cannot provide absolute assurance due to its inherent 
limitations, and that managers of firms can circumvent or override internal control to facilitate 
consumption of private benefits, internal control may not constrain misappropriation of corporate 
resources and enhance operational efficiency. 
We test the association between ineffective internal control and operational efficiency 
using a large sample of firms that reported internal control opinions under SOX 404 during the 
period 2004 to 2011. A firm is deemed to have ineffective internal control in a particular fiscal 
year if it reports at least one material weakness in internal control.5 Following prior research, we 
use the frontier analysis—Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)—to measure firm operational 
                                                 
5 According to Auditing Standards No. 2 (PCAOB 2004), a material weakness is “a significant deficiency, or 
combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 
the financial statements will not be prevented or detected.” A significant deficiency is “a control deficiency, or 
combination of control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to initiate, authorize, record, 
process, or report external financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such 
that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial 
statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.” 
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efficiency.6 Consistent with our prediction, we find that operational efficiency is significantly 
lower for firms with material weaknesses compared to firms without such weaknesses. This 
finding holds after controlling for factors associated with operational efficiency and determinants 
of material weaknesses. The finding is also robust to various sensitivity checks, which include 
using the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, controlling for lagged return on assets and 
operational efficiency, using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach to estimate our regression by 
industry, using a decile ranked measure of operational efficiency, using an operational efficiency 
measure estimated from three input variables as in Baik et al. (2013), and using an alternative 
measure of operational efficiency derived from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis. We also 
conduct a change analysis using the sample of material weakness firms as their own control. We 
find that an improvement (deterioration) in internal control effectiveness is associated with an 
increase (decrease) in operational efficiency.  
Next, we conduct cross-sectional analyses to shed light on the mechanisms through which 
effective internal control leads to greater operational efficiency: (1) reducing the likelihood of 
misappropriation of corporate resources and (2) enhancing the quality of internal reports for 
decision making. Consistent with the first channel, we find that the adverse effect of internal 
control material weaknesses on operational efficiency is exacerbated for firms with more liquid 
assets and for firms operating in more geographical regions. This result suggests that when 
managers/employees have more opportunities for misappropriation of resources, the benefits of 
effective internal control in enhancing firm operational efficiency are more pronounced. 
Consistent with the second channel, we find that the negative effect of internal control material 
                                                 
6 The DEA methodology has been used extensively in operations research and management accounting research to 
evaluate organizations’ efficiency (see Callen 1991 for a review). For example, Murthi et al. (1996) use DEA to 
measure marketing efficiency, and Leverty and Grace (2012) use DEA to examine the relative efficiency of 
insurance companies. DEA provides a specific measure of the overall firm-level operational efficiency that is based 
on the relation between inputs and outputs.  
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weaknesses on operational efficiency is exacerbated for firms with higher operating cash flow 
volatility, greater analyst forecast errors, and higher corporate opacity. To the extent that greater 
uncertainty and poorer information environments are correlated with managers’ demand for 
higher quality internal information for decision making, our result is consistent with the notion 
that effective internal control leads to greater operational efficiency by enhancing the quality of 
internal reports. 
Because smaller firms experience a disproportional amount of costs for implementing SOX, 
it is important to understand whether the benefit of effective internal control is also larger for 
these firms. For this purpose, we investigate whether the effect of internal control effectiveness 
on operational efficiency varies with firm size. We find that the negative effect of material 
weaknesses on firm operational efficiency is more pronounced for firms with smaller market 
capitalization, particularly those with market capitalization between $75million and $250 million. 
This finding is consistent with smaller firms benefitting more from having effective internal 
control in terms of operational efficiency, informing the debate over the costs and benefits of 
SOX 404 as further exemptions are deliberated.  
We also investigate whether the market understands the effect of ineffective internal 
control on operational efficiency. We find that within firms with material weaknesses, those with 
more negative market reaction experience a larger deterioration in operational efficiency. This 
finding indicates that the negative market reaction to the disclosure of material weaknesses, as 
documented in prior research (Hammersley et al. 2008; Beniesh et al. 2008), is partly due to 
investors’ concerns that material weaknesses can harm the firm’s operational efficiency and 
hence future profitability. 
In our last analysis, we attempt to shed some light on the “monetary” benefits of effective 
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internal control in terms of operational efficiency. Specifically, we examine how the changes in 
internal control effectiveness correspond to future operating performance and stock returns. 
Focusing on the sample of firms with ineffective internal control, we find that firms that 
remediate (do not remediate) material weaknesses have better (worse) return on assets in the two 
years after the material weakness disclosure. Among firms that remediate their material 
weaknesses, we further document that the improvement in return on assets is mainly attributed to 
those that improve their operational efficiency upon the discovery of material weaknesses. 
Remediating firms that show no improvement in operational efficiency continue to suffer 
deterioration in return on assets. The results are qualitatively similar when we examine one-year 
or two-year-ahead stock returns. Overall, this finding sheds light on how the operational 
efficiency benefits of maintaining effective internal control translate to operating and stock 
performance. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, while prior studies 
have shown that effective internal control mitigates information risk and enhances the quality of 
internal management reports, no study has linked the effectiveness of internal control to the 
firm’s internal operations. Our study extends prior research by documenting that effective 
internal control improves firm operational efficiency, presumably through reducing the 
likelihood of misappropriation of corporate resources and through enhancing the quality of 
internal reports for decision making. Our study hence adds to an emerging literature that 
examines the implications of internal control beyond financial reporting quality (e.g., Cheng et 
al. 2013; Feng et al. 2013; Bauer 2013). Our study also complements Masli et al. (2010), who 
examine the potential benefits from implementing internal control monitoring technology 
designed to support and facilitate internal control processes. Our study shows that a potential 
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benefit of the better internal control processes is improved firm operational efficiency.  
Our paper is closely related to Feng et al. (2013). They document that firms with 
ineffective internal control over inventory have systematically lower inventory turnover and 
higher inventory impairments. While Feng et al. examine whether a specific type of material 
weaknesses in internal control adversely affects one aspect of firm operations, our study provides 
comprehensive evidence on the link between internal control and the operational efficiency by 
considering all types of material weaknesses in internal control and an overall measure of 
operational efficiency. Furthermore, Feng et al. focus on inventory turnover and inventory 
impairments, which are essentially financial ratios that proxy for operational efficiency. As 
discussed in Baik et al. (2013, p2), the frontier analysis provides an advantage over simple 
financial ratios by implicitly allowing for differential weightings on inputs, leading to a more 
precise measure of operational efficiency compared to simple financial ratios. Our study also 
differentiates from and extends Feng et al. by providing insights into the channels through which 
internal control affects operational efficiency. 
Second, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the costs versus benefits of SOX 
404 reporting. To the extent that greater operational efficiency translates into higher profitability, 
as documented in this paper, the greater operational efficiency achieved through having effective 
ICFR can help offset the compliance costs of SOX 404. Finally, our study sheds light on the 
documented negative market reaction to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses 
(Hammersley et al. 2008; Beneish et al. 2008). Our findings suggest that the market understands 
the implications of weak internal control, not just for financial reporting quality as prior research 
suggests, but also for firm operational efficiency and future profitability.  
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related 
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literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the primary and additional analyses, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Related literature 
In an attempt to restore investor confidence in firms’ financial reporting, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 requires firms to assess and disclose, and auditors to certify, the effectiveness 
of ICFR (SEC 2002, 2003). Presumably, regulators hope that these requirements can improve the 
quality of internal control and enhance the reliability of financial reporting. To shed light on 
whether the internal control requirements achieve these objectives, prior research has examined 
whether the effectiveness of internal control is positively correlated with financial reporting 
quality. For instance, Doyle et al. (2007a) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) find that effective 
internal control can enhance financial reporting quality, proxied for by accruals quality and the 
size of abnormal accruals. Beneish et al. (2008) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find that 
effective internal control reduces information risk, which in turn lowers a firm’s cost of equity. 
However, Ogneva et al. (2007) fail to find a significant relation between internal control 
weaknesses and cost of equity after controlling for firm characteristics and analyst forecast bias. 
Recent studies further document that material weaknesses in internal control are associated with 
a higher cost of debt (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2011). 
There is an emerging literature examining the implications of internal control beyond 
financial reporting. For example, Feng et al. (2009) find a positive relation between internal 
control quality and management guidance accuracy, consistent with ineffective internal control 
leading to inaccurate internal management reports. Cheng et al. (2013) examine the investment 
behavior of a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses. They find that prior to 
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the disclosure, these firms under-invest (over-invest) when they are financially constrained 
(unconstrained). However, after the disclosure, these firms’ investment efficiency improves 
significantly. Their results are consistent with ineffective internal control adversely affecting 
investment efficiency. Feng et al. (2013) investigate whether ineffective internal control over 
inventory affects inventory management. The authors argue that inventory-related material 
weaknesses in internal control can result in suboptimal order quantities, leading to higher 
inventory levels and higher holding costs. In addition, inaccurate inventory tracking and internal 
valuation processes can lead to mismanagement of inventory, resulting in larger and more 
frequent inventory impairments as out-of-date or obsolete product loses market value. Consistent 
with their expectations, they find that firms with ineffective internal control over inventory have 
systematically lower inventory turnover and a higher likelihood and magnitude of inventory 
impairments. Their study hence provides insights into how material weaknesses in internal 
control over inventory adversely affect inventory management. It is, however, not clear whether 
material weaknesses in general affect operational efficiency at the overall firm level, the issue 
that we examine in this paper.  
2.2 Hypothesis development 
In this study, we argue that ineffective internal control can have a negative effect on firm 
operational efficiency for two non-exclusive reasons. First, prior studies have shown that firms 
with ineffective internal control have poorer financial reporting quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). To the extent that less reliable financial reporting increases 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Lambert et al. 2007), ineffective internal 
control prevents the effective monitoring of managers and exacerbates agency problems. 
Consistent with this argument, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2013) find that the profitability of insider 
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trading, a proxy for managerial rent extraction, is larger for firms with material weaknesses in 
internal control. As such, one can expect managers’ misappropriation of corporate resources to 
be greater among firms with ineffective internal control.7 Some anecdotal evidence also suggests 
that ineffective internal control can lead to a lax environment facilitating the diversion of 
company resources by top management through related party transactions. See the material 
weakness disclosure by Hollinger International Inc. in its 10-Q report for the quarter ending June 
30, 2004 for an example.8 Ineffective internal control can hence increase the likelihood that 
inputs available for production are diverted for managers’ personal consumption, reducing the 
outputs generated for a given initial amount of inputs and leading to lower operational efficiency.  
Furthermore, material weaknesses in the form of inadequate physical security allow the 
misappropriation of inputs by employees, and inadequate segregation of duties or inadequate 
documentation, policies or other means of justifying account balances allow for the alteration of 
recorded amounts by employees, all of which can have a detrimental effect on the input-output 
relationship. MGP Ingredients Inc. provides a vivid description of the issue in its 10-K for the 
fiscal year ending December 31, 2005.9 Essentially, the lack of proper control over the physical 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) argue that ineffective internal control over information and assets within 
the firm can adversely affect firms’ real decisions including the misappropriation of firm assets by management, 
thus reducing the expected value of cash flows to investors. 
8 The company disclosed, among others, the following material weaknesses: (i) the “tone from the top” established 
by the former executive officers was inappropriate to the establishment of an environment in which strong systems 
of internal controls and disclosure controls and procedures are encouraged, (ii) the management and corporate 
organizational structures facilitated extraction of assets from the company by way of related party transactions to 
benefit direct and indirect controlling stockholders, (iii) common directorships, among certain former executive 
officers, at the company and its direct and indirect parent companies and their affiliates, facilitated inappropriate 
related party transactions between the company and those entities, and (iv) clear and appropriate policies for the 
identification, reporting, approval and disclosure of related party and other significant transactions did not exist. 
9 Specifically, the company disclosed that “Physical security over maintenance materials, electrical materials and 
chemicals at the Atchison, Kansas facility is not adequate to ensure that items removed from the facilities are 
documented in accordance with Company policy. This could result in unauthorized or undocumented removal of 
such materials. As a result, financial statement presentation of such items could be affected, particularly our interim 
statements in connection with which we do not perform physical inventories at period end….All modules of our 
computerized purchasing and maintenance system are accessible to various employees with access to the system, 
which includes purchasing, receiving, maintenance and administrative employees. Unlimited access to a system of 
this type could allow an individual to establish fictitious vendors, purchase items for other than business use and 
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security of inputs can lead to wastage and pilferage, hence resulting in higher input costs. In 
addition, MGP’s material weaknesses relating to the controls over the purchase and maintenance 
of materials and supplies can result in inputs not being procured at the lowest possible costs 
(hence increasing input costs) or inputs being procured at a more inferior quality (hence leading 
to lower sales), both of which result in lower operational efficiency for the firm.   
Second, ineffective internal control can lead to erroneous internal management reports and 
thus lower firm operational efficiency. For example, material weaknesses relating to information 
technology can impair a firm’s ability to capture, process and record raw transactional data 
corresponding to economic events, resulting in errors in internal management reports. Consistent 
with this notion, Feng et al. (2009) find that material weaknesses in internal control affect the 
financial inputs to management guidance and they document less accurate guidance among firms 
reporting ineffective internal control.10 The authors further argue that “…..beyond issuing 
guidance, the internal management reports are also the basis for managers to make many day-to-
day operational decisions. Hence, our findings on the effect of internal control quality on 
management guidance have potential implications for other management decisions based on 
internal reports.”  
These discussions suggest that erroneous internal management reports can have 
                                                                                                                                                             
cover up errors that occur within the system. Invoices are not consistently reviewed and approved by someone other 
than individuals placing the order with the vendor. Further, our personnel have sometimes failed to use or maintain 
required requisition forms in the purchase of maintenance, electrical and chemical type items. These practices could 
result in unauthorized and undocumented purchases.” 
10 To illustrate how ineffective internal controls can lead to erroneous internal reports, Feng et al. (2009) provide the 
example of a material weakness disclosed by Dana Corp. in the 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2005. 
Specifically, Dana Corp. disclosed that “Our financial and accounting organization was not adequate to support our 
financial accounting and reporting needs. Specifically, lines of communication between our operations and 
accounting and finance personnel were not adequate to raise issues to the appropriate level of accounting personnel 
and we did not maintain a sufficient complement of personnel with an appropriate level of accounting knowledge, 
experience and training in the application of GAAP commensurate with our financial reporting requirements. This 
control deficiency resulted in ineffective controls over the accurate and complete recording of certain customer 
contract pricing changes and asset sale contracts (both within and outside of the Commercial Vehicle business unit) 
to ensure they were accounted for in accordance with GAAP.” 
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implications for firm operational efficiency. For example, ineffective internal control can 
adversely affect the firm’s ability to forecast sales, which in turn can adversely affect managers’ 
production decisions for the next period.11 Over-forecasting of sales can result in overprovision 
of productive inputs and consequently increased costs in the form of inventory obsolescence, 
storage, idle capacity, redundant manpower, and wastage of resources. On the other hand, under-
forecasting of sales can result in under-provision of productive inputs that may eventually lead to 
increased costs in the form of rushed overtime work to produce the inventory or last minute 
sourcing of potentially more expensive raw materials. In both cases, cost inefficiency arises 
because higher input costs are incurred for a given amount of outputs. Hence, ineffective internal 
control can result in operational inefficiency by impairing the quality of internal reports which 
lead to poorer decision making.  
The above discussion leads to our first hypothesis (in alternative form):    
H1: There is a negative association between firm operational efficiency and material 
weaknesses in internal control. 
 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, there are two reasons why we may not find results 
consistent with H1. First, internal control cannot provide absolute assurance due to its inherent 
limitations. In its guidance to management regarding the evaluation and assessment of internal 
control over financial reporting, the SEC states that “internal control is a process that involves 
human diligence and compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns resulting 
from human failures. It also can be circumvented by collusion or improper management override 
(SEC 2007).” Furthermore, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), in 
                                                 
11 Feng et al. (2009) find that ineffective internal control leads to less accurate earnings forecast. Given that prior 
studies argue that sales and cost of goods sold are very important inputs to a manager’s earnings forecast (e.g., 
Lundholm and Sloan 2006; Fairfield et al. 1996), it is reasonable to assume that ineffective internal control would 
lead to less accurate sales forecasts. Consistent with this notion, Cassar and Gibson (2008) find that small privately 
held firms that have effective internal accounting reporting and budgeting processes in place tend to make more 
accurate revenue forecasts. 
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its guidance to audit committees in addressing the risk of fraud through management override of 
internal control, notes that “even though internal control over financial reporting may appear to 
be well-designed and effective, controls that are otherwise effective can be overridden by 
management in every entity (AICPA 2005).” Management override is very difficult to detect 
because they are typically not documented or disclosed due to the intent to cover up the actions 
(AICPA 2005; COSO 2013).12 Hence, to the extent that internal control has inherent limitations 
and managers are able to circumvent or override internal control to facilitate consumption of 
private benefits, internal control might not be able to constrain the misappropriation of corporate 
resources and improve operational efficiency.13  
Second, because the intended objective of SOX 404 is to improve the reliability of the 
firm’s external reports so as to enhance the decision making of external users (PCAOB 2004; 
Donaldson 2005), few have envisaged the importance or potential benefits of ICFR for internal 
users. Hence, it is possible that while managers understand the implications of ICFR for external 
reporting, they may not recognize the same for internal reporting. Consistent with this notion, 
based on a survey of 2,901 corporate insiders to assess the costs and benefits of complying with 
Section 404, Alexander et al. (2013) find that managers do not believe that this regulation can 
improve the efficiency of their firms’ operations. If this is the case, the hypothesized benefits of 
effective internal control on operational efficiency may not materialize. 
As a result, whether we can find results consistent with H1 is an empirical question.  
                                                 
12 According to COSO (2013), management override refers to actions taken to override an entity’s controls for 
illegitimate purposes, including personal gain or an enhanced presentation of an entity’s financial condition or 
compliance status. For example, to allow a large shipment of goods to a customer with unacceptable credit in order 
to increase revenue, a manager might improperly override internal control by approving the sale transaction.  
13 It is possible that firms have material weaknesses in their internal control, but they are not reported either because 
management and the auditor do not detect the weakness, or they detect it but opt not to disclose it (Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2007; Rice and Weber 2012). This omission will bias against finding results consistent with H1.    
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2.3 Cross-sectional analyses: H2 and H3 
In this section, we develop additional hypotheses to shed light on the mechanisms through 
which internal control effectiveness affects operational efficiency. In the hypothesis development 
above, we argue that effective internal control leads to greater operational efficiency through (1) 
reducing the likelihood of misappropriation of corporate resources and (2) enhancing the quality 
of internal reports, which in turn leads to better decision making. Thus, we identify 
circumstances where each of the two mechanisms is particularly relevant and important.  
Related to the first channel, we hypothesize that for firms that have more opportunities for 
asset misappropriation, effective internal control should play a more important role in preventing 
the diversion of resources by managers or employees. Consequently, we should observe a 
stronger negative association between operational efficiency and material weaknesses in internal 
control for these firms. Prior research suggests two conditions under which the misappropriation 
of corporate resources is more likely to occur. First, Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that liquid 
assets are more difficult to trace and are easier to divert for private consumption than other assets, 
making them more vulnerable to extraction. Consistent with this notion, Caprio et al. (2013) find 
that in countries where the threat of political extraction is higher, firms hold a lower fraction of 
their assets in liquid form. Second, Bushman et al. (2004) argue that firms competing in multiple 
geographic regions face more complex operational and informational environments, and 
therefore require more monitoring activities to alleviate moral hazard problems. Bodnar et al. 
(1999) also contend that coordinating activities of different parts of the firm and delegating 
resources and authority to geographically diverse locations can increase agency costs and make 
monitoring more difficult and costly. Hence, we expect the opportunities for misappropriation of 
resources to be greater for firms with more liquid assets and multiple geographic regions.  
The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis:  
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H2: The negative association between firm operational efficiency and material weaknesses 
in internal control, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger for firms with more liquid assets 
and for firms with greater geographical diversification. 
 
For the second channel, we exploit settings in which there is a greater demand for higher 
quality internal reports for decision making. We conjecture that for firms that operate in more 
volatile business environments or in poorer information environments, the managers can benefit 
more from accurate internal reports for budgeting, resource allocation, and capital investments. 
Supporting this notion, prior studies find that greater uncertainty creates a need for more 
information and hence the use of management accounting systems (e.g., Gordon and Narayanan 
1984; Davila and Foster 2005). For example, Cassar and Gibson (2008) document a significant 
positive association between internal accounting report preparation and revenue forecast 
accuracy and this effect is driven mainly by firms with high information uncertainty. Hence, we 
should observe a stronger negative association between operational efficiency and internal 
control material weaknesses for firms with more uncertain business environments or poorer 
information environments.  
The above discussion leads to our third hypothesis:  
H3: The negative association between firm operational efficiency and material weaknesses 
in internal control, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger for firms with more uncertain 
business environments and poorer information environments.  
 
3 Research design  
3.1 Sample selection 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure. From Audit Analytics, we 
first identify a sample of 32,897 firm-year observations (6,593 unique firms) with a SOX 404 
disclosure in the period 2004-2011. We exclude 13,158 firm-year observations that are from 
financial industries, 180 firm-year observations with missing data to measure firm efficiency, 
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and 2,138 firm-year observations with missing data on other variables used in the analyses. The 
final sample consists of 17,421 firm-year observations representing 3,907 unique firms.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the sample distribution of firm-year observations with ineffective 
ICFR over time. Over the period 2004 to 2011, 8.10% of the observations have ineffective ICFR. 
However, there is a declining trend in the proportion of firm-year observations with ineffective 
ICFR, dropping from 17.77% in 2004 to 4.08% in 2011.  
3.2 Measuring operational efficiency 
As mentioned earlier, we use DEA to create a measure of firm operational efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY). It measures operational efficiency by creating an efficient frontier of production 
based on an optimization programming to maximize a ratio of outputs to inputs. This approach 
produces an ordinal ranking by measuring the relative efficiency of a firm compared to those 
firms located on the efficient frontier (i.e., the firms that produce the maximum level of outputs 
given the level of inputs or use the minimum level of inputs given the level of outputs). After 
solving an optimization programming for each firm within an estimation group, DEA analysis 
standardizes efficiency scores so that the most (least) efficient firms are assigned a value of one 
(zero). The advantage of the DEA approach is that it is a nonparametric method and one does not 
need to impose a specific functional form for the relationship between outputs and inputs or 
assign a priori factor weightings on inputs since the optimal weightings are derived from the 
data. See Cooper et al. (2000) for detailed discussion of the DEA method. 
In this study, we follow Demerjian et al. (2012) and other related studies in estimating 
operational efficiency. Because efficiency measures are derived based on the relation between 
inputs and outputs, it is critical to choose inputs and outputs that adequately describe a firm’s 
production function. Prior research uses sales revenue as the output variable because it is a 
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primary source of earnings and cash flows generated from firms’ operating activities (Verma 
1993; Thore et al. 1994; Demerjian et al. 2012). As in Demerjian et al. (2012), we use seven 
input variables: (i) net property, plant and equipment (PP&E), (ii) cost of goods sold (COGS), 
and (iii) selling, general, and administrative costs (SG&A), (iv) capitalized operating leases, (v) 
capitalized research and development (R&D) costs, (vi) purchased goodwill, and (vii) other 
intangibles. These seven inputs capture, to a large degree, the choices managers make in 
generating revenue. The five stock variables (PP&E, capitalized operating leases, capitalized 
R&D costs, purchased goodwill, and other intangibles) are measured at the beginning of the 
year, and the two flow variables (COGS and SG&A) are measured over the year. Following 
Demerjian et al. (2012), we estimate EFFICIENCY by industry (Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification) to increase the comparability of business models and cost structures 
among peer firms.14 Appendix A provides details of the estimation process. 
3.3 Regression model 
To test the relation between internal control effectiveness and firm operational efficiency, 
we estimate the following regression: 
  + SIC_CONTROL + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY + ICMW +  = EFFICIENCY ititititit εγϕβα , (1) 
where EFFICIENCYit refers to our measure of operational efficiency, ICMWit is an indicator 
variable that equals one if firm i discloses internal control material weaknesses in year t, and zero 
otherwise. H1 predicts the coefficient on ICMWit to be negative.   
EFFICIENCY_CONTROLS refers to the determinants of operational efficiency. We follow 
                                                 
14 Demerjian et al. (2012) note that one limitation of using the Fama and French (1997) industries is that most firms 
operate in several industries. Even within the same industry, the relation between the accounting inputs and outputs 
can vary substantially depending on firms’ asset and operations mix. We acknowledge that this estimation procedure 
does not allow us to control for differences in accounting policies among firms within the same industry. However, 
as argued in Demerjian et al. (2012), this limitation likely introduces noises to the operational efficiency measure, 
and we do not have strong reason to believe that it will introduce systematic bias to our analyses. 
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Demerjian et al. (2012) in selecting determinants of firm operational efficiency. First, larger 
firms and firms with higher market share are usually more effective than others in negotiating 
terms with suppliers and customers. Hence, we include the log of total assets (LOG_TA) and the 
percentage of revenues earned by a firm within its Fama and French (1997) industry 
(MKTSHARE). Second, we control for free cash flow (FCF) because managers in firms with 
greater positive free cash flows are able to pursue positive net present value projects more 
effectively. Third, we include firm age (LOG_AGE) because the life cycle of a firm can affect 
management’s opportunity set of possible projects as well as the required start-up costs of 
investments. Finally, operating in multiple industries and/or countries requires a broader 
knowledge set and reduces the amount of attention management pays to any single industry, 
hence reducing managers’ ability to efficiently allocate capital. We control for firm 
diversification using the Herfindahl index for business segment concentration 
(CONCENTRATION) and an indicator variable signifying foreign operations (FOREIGN).  
Prior studies suggest that firms with material weaknesses systematically differ from firms 
with effective internal control (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b). Thus, we 
include the determinants of internal control effectiveness (IC_CONTROLS) to control for their 
effect on operational efficiency. Specifically, firms with ineffective internal control tend to be 
smaller, poorly performing, subject to greater accounting measurement application risks, more 
complex, involved in mergers and acquisitions or restructuring, operating in a more litigious 
industry, audited by Big N auditors, and involved in an auditor change. Hence, IC_CONTROLS 
includes an indicator variables for loss firms (LOSS), the amount of inventory relative to total 
assets (INVENTORY),15 the number of reported business and geographic segments 
                                                 
15 According to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), rapidly growing firms and firms with higher inventory levels are 
subject to greater accounting measurement application risks. Specifically, rapidly growing firms are more likely to 
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(SEGMENTS), firms involved in mergers and acquisitions (MERGER) or restructuring 
(RESTRUCTURE), firms operating in a litigious industry (LITIGATION), an indicator variable 
for rapid sales growth (EXTREME_GROWTH), firms audited by a Big 4 auditor (BIG4), and 
firms that have changed auditors in the fiscal year (AUD_CHANGE).  
Appendix B includes the detailed definition of all variables. All p-values are based on the 
standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-clustering (Petersen 2009). 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the distribution of EFFICIENCY for the full sample and then by 
industry. The average efficiency score is 0.374.16 As in previous studies (e.g., Demerjian et al. 
2012), we observe a substantial variation in efficiency across industries; the mean ranges from 
0.012 to 0.855.17 Hence, we include industry fixed effects in all our analyses to control for inter-
industry differences in operational efficiency. Panel B of Table 2 reports the mean firm 
efficiency and the number and percentage of firms that are on the efficient frontier by year. 
While there is some year-to-year variation in the efficiency score over the sample period, the 
variation is relatively small.18  
                                                                                                                                                             
have systems that fail to keep pace with increases in customer demand or entry into new markets. They are also 
more likely to encounter staffing issues as the scope and complexity of their operations expand. Firms with more 
inventory face increased internal control risks related to the proper measurement and recording of inventory, 
misreporting due to theft, and timely recognition of inventory obsolescence. 
16 This average efficiency score is lower than that of 0.57 in Demerjian et al. (2012) and that of 0.79 in Baik et al. 
(2013). However, these studies use the data from a much longer period than our study and thus are not directly 
comparable. 
17 We also observe that the percentage of firms that are on or close to the efficient frontier differs across industries. 
For example, 0.3% (6.0%) of firms have an efficiency score greater than or equal to 0.9 in ‘Drugs’ (‘Paper’) industry 
(untabulated). Prior studies suggest that such inter-industry variation could be due to the competitiveness of the 
industry and the number of observations available for the estimation of the efficiency frontier. In our sample, small 
industries generally have a higher concentration of firms on or close to the efficient frontier. We address the inter-
industry variation by including industry fixed effects in the main analysis and by estimating the regression by 
industry in a sensitivity test.  
18 The first-order autocorrelation of the DEA score is 0.88 (untabulated), comparable to that of 0.84 documented in 
Baik et al. (2013).  Although this suggests that operational efficiency is sticky over time, we argue that material 
weaknesses in internal control can result in significant changes in operational efficiency. To the extent that our DEA 
measure is sticky over time, this should bias against finding significant result. In addition, in Section 5.1, we conduct 
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Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on EFFICIENCY and firm 
characteristics, separately for firm-years with internal control material weakness and those 
without. The mean EFFICIENCY is significantly lower for firm-year observations with 
ineffective internal control (0.350) than for those with effective internal control (0.377). This 
result provides preliminary evidence on the negative association between internal control 
material weaknesses and operational efficiency. Among the determinants of operational 
efficiency, we find that firms with ineffective internal control are smaller, younger, have lower 
market share, lower free cash flows, and are less likely to have foreign operations. For the 
determinants of internal control effectiveness, we find that firms with ineffective internal control 
are more likely to be experiencing losses, undergoing restructuring, operating in a litigious 
industry, experiencing extreme sales growth, audited by a Big 4 auditor, and involved in an 
auditor change. These results are generally consistent with prior studies.     
Panel D of Table 2 presents correlations among firm operational efficiency, internal control 
material weaknesses, and control variables. As predicted, the correlation between EFFICIENCY 
and ICMW is significantly negative. Most of the control variables are significantly correlated 
with EFFICIENCY. An analysis of variance inflation factors (untabulated) suggests that our 
multivariate analyses are not subject to multicollinearity concerns. 
4 Empirical results  
4.1 Internal control material weaknesses and firm operational efficiency 
Table 3 presents the regression results on the association between internal control material 
weaknesses and firm operational efficiency. The model in Column (1) only controls for the 
determinants of operational efficiency. We find that the coefficient on ICMW is negative and 
                                                                                                                                                             
a change analysis to examine whether the changes in internal control effectiveness are associated with the changes in 
operational efficiency.  
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significant (p = 0.001), indicating that operational efficiency is lower for firm-years with 
ineffective internal control. The coefficients on the operational efficiency determinants suggest 
that operational efficiency is higher for larger firms, older firms, firms with more free cash flows, 
and firms with higher business segment concentration, but lower for firms with higher market 
share.  
Column (2) of Table 3 presents the result after further including the determinants of 
internal control effectiveness. The coefficient on ICMW continues to be significantly negative (p 
= 0.003). Column (2) also indicates that operational efficiency is lower for firms that have poorer 
performance and firms that undergo restructuring, but higher for firms that have more 
inventories, firms that are involved in mergers and acquisitions, and firms that experience high 
sales growth.  
We conduct a series of robustness checks and do not tabulate the results for brevity 
reasons. The inferences based on these analyses remain the same. First, it is possible that firms 
with lower operational efficiency have poorer financial performance (Baik et al. 2013), which in 
turn increases the likelihood of internal control problems (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et 
al. 2007b). To control for this reverse causality, we employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
procedure. In the first stage, we estimate a probit regression of the likelihood of having an ICMW 
on the determinants (i.e., IC_CONTROLS).  From this regression, we calculate the inverse Mills 
ratio LAMBDA and include it in Equation (1) when conducting the second-stage analysis. 
Second, we re-estimate Equation (1) by controlling for lagged return on assets and operational 
efficiency. Third, to make the efficiency score more comparable over time and across industries 
and to mitigate the influence of extreme observations, we re-estimate Equation (1) using the 
decile rank of EFFICIENCY by year and industry. Fourth, in an alternative approach to control 
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for industry fixed effects, we use the Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach to estimate our 
regression by industry. Fifth, we follow Baik et al. (2013) and measure operational efficiency 
using only three input variables: (i) net property, plant and equipment, (ii) cost of goods sold, 
and (iii) selling, general, and administrative costs. Finally, we use an alternative measure of 
operational efficiency derived from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which is a parametric 
approach to model the relationship between outputs and inputs.19 We use the same seven inputs 
used in the DEA measure and estimate a SFA model for each industry group (see Appendix A 
for details).  
4.2 Cross-sectional analyses: Tests of H2 and H3  
We use the following regression model to test H2 and H3: 
  + SIC_CONTROL + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY+





  + SIC_CONTROL + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY+




δλβα ×  (2'') 
where Appropriation are proxies for the ease of misappropriation of corporate resources, 
Information are proxies for the demand for higher quality internal reports for decision making, 
and all other variables are defined as before. 
To test H2, we use two proxies to capture the ease of asset misappropriation. Our first 
proxy is the amount of the liquid assets (LIQUID), defined as current assets divided by total 
assets. Our second proxy is the number of geographical segments reported by the firm 
(GEO_SEGMENTS).  To mitigate the effect of extreme values and to facilitate result 
interpretation, we use standardized decile ranks of the variables by industry. Panel A of Table 4 
                                                 
19 The advantage of using a parametric method such as SFA is to allow random shocks in the production process in 
measuring efficiency. However, unlike DEA, to use the SFA model, one has to specify a specific functional form for 
the relation between inputs and outputs and distributional assumption on the random error term, which could be 
arbitrary (e.g., Stone 2002). 
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presents the regression results. As reported in the table, the coefficient on ICMW × LIQUID is 
negative and marginally significant (p = 0.141), implying that the operational inefficiency 
associated with material weaknesses is more pronounced for firms with more liquid assets. 
Similarly, the coefficient on ICMW × GEO_SEGMENTS is negative and significant (p = 0.060). 
This result indicates that when firms have more geographical segments, it becomes more difficult 
to monitor the misappropriation of resources, exacerbating the adverse effects of material 
weaknesses on operational efficiency. Overall, these cross-sectional results show that in settings 
where the managers and other employees have more opportunities for misappropriation of 
corporate resources, the effect of internal control on firm operational efficiency is stronger. This 
finding is consistent with our conjecture that effective internal control leads to greater 
operational efficiency by reducing the likelihood of misappropriation of corporate resources.  
To test H3, we use three proxies to capture the business environment uncertainty and the 
quality of the firm’s information environment, and hence the demand for higher quality internal 
reports for decision making. Our first proxy is operating cash flow volatility (OCFVOL). 
Unstable market conditions likely affect a firm’s cash flow generating abilities and lead to 
greater volatility in operating cash flow (Gong et al. 2009). OCFVOL is measured as the standard 
deviation of operating cash flow divided by total assets in the past five years. Our second proxy 
is analyst forecast error (AF_ERROR). Much of the information that the analysts use comes from 
the firm, and the accuracy of the analyst forecast reflects the quality of the firm’s information 
environment (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Furthermore, analysts are likely to face greater 
difficulty in forecasting earnings of firms that operate in more volatile and uncertain business 
environments, which can lead to greater forecast errors. AF_ERROR is measured as the absolute 
difference between the analyst consensus forecast and actual earnings per share, divided by the 
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stock price at beginning of the year. Our third proxy is the corporate opacity index (OPACITY), 
as developed in Anderson et al. (2009), which is based on the number of analysts following, 
analyst forecast error, trading volume, and bid-ask spread.20 We use standardized decile ranks of 
each of these variables by industry to mitigate the effect of extreme values.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. We find that the coefficients on ICMW × 
OCFVOL, ICMW × AF_ERROR, and ICMW × OPACITY are all significantly negative (p = 
0.043, 0.010, and 0.077, respectively). These results indicate that the negative effect of material 
weaknesses on operational efficiency is greater for firms with higher operating cash flow 
volatility, greater analyst forecast error, and higher corporate opacity. To the extent that these 
proxies capture managers’ demand for higher quality information for decision making, our result 
is consistent with effective internal control resulting in greater operational efficiency through 
enhancing the quality of internal reports.  
Overall, the above results indicate that the effectiveness of internal control is particularly 
important for firms that are subject to more severe asset misappropriation and for firms with 
higher information uncertainty. These results suggest that effective internal control leads to 
greater operational efficiency through reducing the likelihood of misappropriation of corporate 
resources and through enhancing the quality of internal reports for decision making. 
5 Additional analyses 
5.1 Change analysis using the sample of firms with material weaknesses 
To provide further evidence on the link between internal control effectiveness and 
operational efficiency, we conduct a change analysis using the sample of firms with material 
                                                 
20 Specifically, Anderson et al. rank or categorize these four individual variables into deciles with the most opaque 
firms taking a value of ten and the least opaque firms assuming a value of one. The four rankings are then summed 
and scaled by a factor of 40 (total possible points) to provide an index that ranges from 0 to 1. Lower values denote 
more transparent firms and higher values denote more opaque firms. 
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weaknesses in the sample period. The advantage of a change analysis is that it uses the same firm 
as its own control and thus mitigates the omitted correlated variable concern by controlling for 
time-invariant firm characteristics. Specifically, we examine whether the changes in internal 
control effectiveness are associated with the changes in operational efficiency in a way 
consistent with the levels regression results documented earlier:  
ititit1it   + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY + ICMW+  = EFFICIENCY εϕβα ∆∆∆    (3') 
      itit
it2it1it
  + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY +




∆           (3'') 
where ΔEFFICIENCYit refers to the change in operational efficiency from year t-1 to t, ΔICMWit 
refers to the change in internal control material weakness dummy from year t-1 to t,21 
IC_WORSEit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports no material weaknesses in 
year t-1 but reports material weaknesses in year t, and zero otherwise, IC_BETTERit is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports material weaknesses in year t-1 but reports no 
material weaknesses in year t, and zero otherwise, ΔEFFICIENCY_CONTROLSit refers to the 
changes in the determinants of operational efficiency from year t-1 to t, except for firm age and 
the indicator variable for foreign operations in which the changes are constants and are thus 
excluded from the analyses.   
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present the regression results of estimating Equations (3') 
and (3''), respectively. Despite the small sample, the inferences are similar to those based on 
Table 3. In Column (1), we find that the coefficient on ΔICMW is significantly negative (p = 
0.008), indicating that the improvement in internal control effectiveness is positively associated 
with the change in operational efficiency and/or the deterioration in internal control effectiveness 
                                                 
21 That is, ΔICMW equals 1 if the firm reports no material weaknesses in year t-1 but reports material weaknesses in 
year t, 0 if the firm does not experience any changes in the effectiveness in internal control, and -1 if the firm reports 
material weaknesses in year t-1 but reports no material weaknesses in year t. 
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is negatively associated with the change in operational efficiency. In Column (2), we find that 
the coefficient on IC_WORSE is significantly negative (p = 0.023), while the coefficient on 
IC_BETTER is significantly positive (p = 0.007). These results indicate that a deterioration 
(improvement) in the effectiveness of internal control is associated with a decrease (increase) in 
operational efficiency. Taken together, the change analyses results are consistent with those 
reported in Section 4.1 and provide further evidence on the negative association between 
ineffective internal control and operational efficiency. 
5.2 Is the effect of internal control effectiveness on operational efficiency larger for small 
firms? 
As mentioned in the introduction, it has been widely documented that smaller firms 
experience a disproportional amount of costs for implementing SOX. However, there is little 
evidence on the differential benefits of SOX 404 for these firms. Because small firms tend to 
have less well-defined internal control processes and less clear segregation of duties (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007b; Gao et al. 2009), they are more susceptible to agency 
problems and managerial rent seeking behaviour. In this subsection, we examine whether smaller 
firms disproportionally gain from having effective internal control in terms of operational 
efficiency. 
We re-estimate Equation (2') by replacing Appropriation with MVE, which is the firm’s 
market capitalization at the end of the second quarter in the year of SOX 404 disclosure (Gao et 
al. 2009). Again, we use the standardized decile ranks in the industry to facilitate result 
interpretation and to mitigate the effect of extreme values. Column (1) of Table 6 reports the 
regression results. The coefficient on ICMW × MVE is significantly positive (p = 0.072). This 
finding suggests that the problem of material weakness is particularly severe for small firms, or 
in other words, the positive effect of effective internal control on operational efficiency is 
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stronger for smaller firms.  
Because firms with market capitalization under $75m are permanently exempt from SOX 
404 compliance under the Dodd-Frank Act and regulators are contemplating extending the 
exemption to all firms with market capitalization below $250 million, we further examine the 
differential effect of internal control on operational efficiency for these two sets of firms. For this 
purpose, we replace MVE with either D_75million or D_250million, which are indicator 
variables that equal 1 for firms with market capitalization below $75 million and below $250 
million, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that the coefficient on 
ICMW × D_75million is negative, although insignificant (p = 0.166), while Column (3) shows 
that the coefficient on ICMW × D_250million is significantly negative (p = 0.078). Finally, we 
re-run the regression by replacing MVE with D_75million and D_75-250million, the latter of 
which is an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms with market capitalization between $75 
million and $250 million. The results presented in Column (4) show that the coefficient on 
ICMW × D_75million is negative and insignificant (p = 0.138), but the coefficient on ICMW × 
D_75-250million is negative and significant (p = 0.097). 
Overall, these results suggest that small firms, especially those with market capitalization 
between $75million and $250 million likely benefit more in terms of improved operational 
efficiency from effective internal control. We believe that these findings can be potentially 
informative to the SEC, managers, and investors and are relevant to the Congress as further 
exemptions from SOX 404 are debated. 
5.3 Does the market understand the implications of ineffective internal control on operational 
efficiency 
Prior studies document that investors react negatively to the disclosure of material 
weaknesses and usually attribute the negative market reaction to the firm’s lower financial 
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reporting quality (Hammersley et al. 2008; Beniesh et al. 2008). Given the above-mentioned 
results, it is possible that the negative market reaction is partly due to investors’ concerns that 
material weaknesses would harm the firm’s operational efficiency and hence future profitability. 
To provide evidence on whether the market understands the implications of ineffective internal 
control on the firm’s operational efficiency, we estimate the following regression: 
  + SIC_CONTROL + _CONTROLSEFFICIENCY+




λβα × , (4) 
where CAR is the three day size-adjusted (CAR_1) or market-adjusted abnormal returns (CAR_2) 
surrounding the date of disclosure of material weaknesses, and all other variables are defined as 
before. We use the standardized decile ranks of CAR by industry to mitigate the effect of extreme 
values.  
Table 7 presents the regression results. We find that the coefficients on ICMW×CAR are 
significantly positive (p < 0.05), implying that within firms with internal control material 
weakness, those with more negative market reaction experience a larger deterioration in 
operational efficiency. This result is consistent with the disclosure of material weaknesses under 
SOX 404 conveying information about the firm’s operational efficiency to investors, and 
investors react negatively to the disclosure due to concerns that material weaknesses would harm 
the firm’s operational efficiency and hence future profitability. Hence, the market appears to 
understand the implications of ineffective internal control on operational efficiency. 
5.4 Analysis of future firm performance and stock returns 
Although our results thus far suggest that firms with more effective internal control have 
greater operational efficiency, it is not clear how this benefit translates into real monetary terms. 
Focusing on the sample of material weakness firms, we examine in this section whether the 
improvement in internal control is accompanied by a subsequent improvement in the operating 
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performance, measured by return on assets (ROA). We define ROA as income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets and calculate abnormal ROA using a matched-
firm approach, as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). For each material weakness firm-year, 
we select a firm in the same industry (Fama-French industry classification) that has the closest 
ROA in the same year.22  
Table 8 presents the findings of our tests of the relation between changes in internal control 
effectiveness and abnormal ROA in years t+1 and t+2. In Panel A, we provide results for firms 
that remediate their weaknesses in year t+1 (remediating firms) and those that do not (non-
remediating firms). We find that future ROA for the non-remediating firms is significantly lower 
than that for their corresponding matched firms. In the first and second year after the disclosure 
of material weakness, non-remediating firms significantly underperform their matched firms in 
ROA by a mean of 3.2 and 8.6 percent, respectively. In contrast, the remediating firms have 
similar ROA after the remediation as their corresponding matched firms.  
To investigate whether an improvement in operational efficiency leads to better ROA for 
the remediating firms, we further split the sample of remediating firms into those that have 
positive or negative changes in their operational efficiency from year t to t+1 (t+2). Panel B 
shows that remediating firms with positive changes in operational efficiency significantly 
outperform their matched firms in ROA by a mean of 2.4 percent (5.0 percent) in year t+1 (t+2). 
On the other hand, remediating firms with negative changes in operational efficiency 
significantly underperform their matched firms in ROA by a mean of 4.1 percent (3.1 percent) in 
year t+1 (t+2). Taken together, the results in Table 8 indicate that the improvement in internal 
control leads to better subsequent operating performance and this is mainly attributable to the 
                                                 
22 For material weakness firm-years that we are unable to find a match using this approach, we choose a firm with 
the closest ROA in the same year without restrictions on industry membership, as suggested by Barber and Lyon 
(1996). The results are quantitatively similar if we do not include these additional observations. 
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improvement in operational efficiency.   
We obtain qualitatively similar results when we examine whether the improvement in 
internal control effectiveness is associated with future stock returns. Using a similar 
methodology, we obtain the abnormal returns (RETURNS) for the first and second year after the 
disclosure of the material weakness. Panel A of Table 9 reports the abnormal returns for the 
remediating and non-remediating firms. We find that in the first and second year after the 
disclosure of material weaknesses, non-remediating firms significantly underperform their 
matched firms in stock returns by a mean of 10.0 and 12.5 percent, respectively. In contrast, the 
returns for the remediating firms experience similar stock returns as their corresponding matched 
firms. In Panel B, we examine abnormal returns for the remediating firms by whether they 
experience positive or negative changes in operational efficiency from year t to t+1 (or t+2). We 
find that remediating firms with positive changes in operational efficiency from year t to t+1 
(t+2) significantly outperform their matched firms in stock returns by a mean of 8.5 percent (7.4 
percent) in year t+1 (t+2). On the other hand, remediating firms with negative changes in 
operational efficiency significantly underperform their matched firms in stock returns by a mean 
of 14.6 percent in year t+1.  
Overall, the results in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that maintaining effective internal control 
helps firms achieve better operating performance and stock returns by improving their 
operational efficiency. 
6 Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine whether effective internal control has implications on firm 
operational efficiency. Using a sample of firms that reported internal control opinions under 
SOX 404 during the period 2004-2011 and the frontier analysis method to measure operational 
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efficiency, we find that operational efficiency is significantly lower in firms disclosing material 
weaknesses in internal control than in other firms. This finding holds after controlling for factors 
associated with operational efficiency and determinants of material weaknesses. The result is 
robust to a battery of sensitivity checks.  
We also conduct additional analyses, which provide several important insights. First, the 
cross-sectional analyses suggest that effective internal control leads to greater operational 
efficiency through (1) reducing the likelihood of misappropriation of corporate resources and (2) 
enhancing the quality of internal reports, which leads to better operational decisions. Second, we 
find some evidence that smaller firms (particularly those with market capitalization between $75 
million and $250 million) benefit more from having effective internal control in terms of 
operational efficiency. Third, we find that within firms with material weaknesses, those with 
more negative market reaction experience a larger deterioration in operational efficiency. This 
finding indicates that the negative market reaction to the disclosure of material weaknesses is 
partly due to investors’ concerns that internal control weaknesses can harm the firm’s operational 
efficiency. Finally, we find that among the firms with material weaknesses, the remediation of 
material weaknesses is followed by an improvement in operating performance and stock returns, 
and this effect is mainly driven by the improvement in operational efficiency. 
Overall, our study documents that effective internal control not only helps external users 
make more informed decision but also enhances firms’ internal operations. This finding 
complements an emerging literature that examines the implications of internal control beyond 
financial reporting (e.g., Cheng et al. 2013; Feng et al. 2013; Bauer 2013). It also informs the 
debate on the costs versus benefits of SOX 404 reporting, which is relevant and timely given that 
regulators have recently grant non-accelerated filers permanent exemption from SOX 404 under 
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the Dodd-Frank Act on grounds of high compliance cost and are currently contemplating to 
extend the exemption to firms with market capitalization between $75 million and $250 million. 
The greater operational efficiency achieved from having effective internal control can partially 
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Appendix A Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) approaches for measuring operational efficiency 
 
The DEA approach is a nonparametric method to evaluate the relative efficiency of 
decision-making units (DMUs) which produce outputs such as sales revenue using some inputs 
such as capital and labor. DEA efficiency is derived from the following optimization 
programming to maximize a ratio of outputs to inputs: 
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗𝑘
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑝                                  (1) 
s.t.𝛼𝑖 ≥  0  and  𝛽𝑗 ≥  0 
where k represents k-th DMU which belong to a group consisting of p DMUs, yik is i-th output, 
and xjk is to the j-th input for k-th DMU. Each input and output are assigned a weight, denoted by 
βj and αi, respectively.  Note that these weights are constrained to be non-negative as both inputs 
and outputs are non-negative.  
The DEA approach attempts to solve the above equation (1) by deriving the optimal 
weights on inputs and outputs, α and β, for each DMU in an estimation group. One should form 
estimation groups to ensure that all DMUs within each group are comparable in terms of the 
relationship between inputs and outputs. In solving the maximization problem, DEA method uses 
all DMUs in the same group. Then, the derived optimal weights are used to calculate a ratio-
based efficiency score for each DMU and to estimate an efficient frontier which represents the 
best performing DMUs.  Lastly, the DEA method standardizes the efficiency scores by scaling 
the scores by the highest score within the group to produce an ordinal ranking so that the most 
efficient DMUs are assigned a value of one while the least efficient DMUs are assigned a value 
of zero.  
 The SFA approach is a parametric method to estimate the relative efficiency. However, 
unlike DEA, SFA attempts to measure efficiency relative to a stochastic frontier of production by 
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allowing random shocks to the production process. In other words, SFA assumes that a unit can 
deviate from an efficient frontier for two reasons: (i) a random shock and (ii) technical 
inefficiency. Furthermore, the SFA approach requires a specific form for the relationship 
between outputs and inputs. Following Coelli et al. (2005) and Baik et al. (2013), we use the 
following translog stochastic production frontier for an estimation group: 
      𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑘𝑡 = 𝛾0 + � 𝛾𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑚
𝑗=1
 + 12� � 𝛾𝑗𝑙 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑚𝑙=1𝑚𝑗=1  + � 𝛾𝑞 t 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡 𝑚𝑗=1+ 𝛾𝑡t  + 12 𝛾𝑡𝑡t2 + 𝜈𝑘𝑡 − 𝑢𝑘𝑡       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1, . . ,𝑝  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1, … .𝑇               (2) 
where k refers to k-th unit which belong to a group consisting of p units, and t refers to t-th year 
representing a time trend. ykt is the output level, and xjkt is the j-th input for k-th unit in year t-th 
year. Note that each input and each combination of inputs are assigned a weight, γ. More 
importantly, vkt are random errors accounting for random effects and assumed to be i.i.d with a 
distribution 𝑁(0,σ𝑣2), while ukt are non-negative random variables representing technical 
ineffieincy and assumed to be i.i.d with 𝑁+(0,σ𝑢2). In addition, the two error terms, v and u, are 
assumed to be independent of each other.    
SFA attempts to maximize the output by estimating the parameters on inputs (i.e., γ). Then, 
using the estimated parameters, SFA produces a measure of operational efficiency by estimating E(exp(−𝑢𝑘𝑡 | e𝑘𝑡), the conditional expectation of the negative of error term related to technical 
inefficiency given the value of total error term. Similar to DEA, SFA produces an ordinal 
ranking of efficiency such that the most efficient units are assigned a value of one while the least 




Appendix B Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
EFFICIENCY A measure of firm efficiency for fiscal year t based on Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Following Demerjian et al. (2012), we measure this 
variable by using one output of revenue (SALE) and seven inputs: net PP&E 
(PPENT), cost of goods sold (COGS), and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (XSGA), capitalized operating leases (MRC1 – 
MRC5), capitalized research and development (R&D) costs (XRD), 
purchased goodwill (GDWL), and other intangibles (INTAN minus 
GDWL); 
 
ICMW An indicator variable for ineffective internal control that takes a value of one 
if a firm reports a material weakness in internal control over financial 
reporting for fiscal year t, and zero otherwise; 
 
LOG_TA The natural logarithm of total assets (AT); 
 
MKTSHARE The percentage of revenues (SALE) earned by a firm within its Fama and 




An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm’s free cash flow 
scaled by total assets is in the top quintile of the sample distribution for 
fiscal year t, and zero otherwise; free cash flow is measured as earnings 
before depreciation and amortization (OIBDP) minus the change in working 
capital (RECT + INVT + ACO – LCO – AP) and capital expenditure 
(CAPX);  
 
LOG_AGE The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years a firm has appeared in 
the Compustat database at the end of fiscal year t; 
 
CONCENTRATION The Herfindahl index for business segment concentration, measured as the 
square of the ratio of individual business segment sales to total sales, 
summed across all business segment for fiscal year t; 
 
FOREIGN An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm reports a non-zero 
value for foreign currency adjustment (FCA) in fiscal year t, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
LOSS An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm reported a loss (IB) 
in any of the last two years, and zero otherwise; 
 
INVENTORY The ratio of inventory (INVT) to total assets (AT); 
 
SEGMENTS The number of reported business and geographic segments for fiscal year t in 
the Compustat segment file; 
 
MERGER An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm reports sales from 
merger and acquisition (AQC) for fiscal year t, and zero otherwise; 
 
RESTRUCTURE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm was involved in a 
restructuring, and zero otherwise; this variable is set to one if any of the 





LITIGATION An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm is in a litigious 
industry (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570 -3577, 3600–3674, 5200-5961, and 
7370), and zero otherwise; 
  
EXTREME_GROWTH An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm’s industry adjusted 
sales growth (SALE) belongs to the top quintile for fiscal year t, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
BIG4 An indicator variable that takes a value of one when a firm’s auditor is a Big 
4 audit firm for fiscal year t, and zero otherwise;  
 
AUD_CHANGE An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm changed auditors in 
fiscal year t, and zero otherwise; 
 








Standard deviation of operating cash flow divided by total assets (OANCF / 




Analyst forecast error, calculated as the absolute difference between analyst 
consensus forecast and actual reported EPS for the fiscal year t, divided by 
the stock price at beginning of the year; analyst annual earnings forecasts are 
obtained from IBES and the consensus is measured as the mean forecast, 
measured three quarters prior to the end of the fiscal year t;  
 
OPACITY A measure of firm opacity adopted from Anderson et al. (2009), which is 
measured as the sum of the decile ranks of four individual proxies, divided 
by 40: (i) trading volume (inverse ranking), (ii) bid-ask spread, (iii) the 
number of analysts following (inverse ranking), and (iv) analyst forecast 
error; 
 
MVE Market value of equity at the end of second quarter of fiscal year t 
(PRCCQ*CSHOQ); 
 
CAR_1 Size-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day window 
centered on the filing date of 10-K that reports a material weakness in 
internal control over financial reporting by using the equally weighted 
market return for firms in the same market capitalization decile; 
  
CAR_2 Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day window 
centered on the filing date of 10-K that reports a material weakness in 
internal control over financial reporting by using the return of value 
weighted market portfolio; 
  
ROA Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by average total assets (AT) for fiscal year t; 
 





Table 1 Sample selection and internal control effectiveness over time 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
Description  Firm-years    Firms 
Firms on Audit Analytics with an internal control disclosure for years 2004-2011 32,897 6,593 
    Less: firms in the financial industries   13,158 2,166 
    Less: observations with missing value on firm efficiency  180 58 
    Less: observations with missing value on firm characteristics  2,138 462 
Final Sample  17,421 3,907 
 
 
Panel B: Internal control effectiveness over time 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Total number of firms 1,761 2,241 2,313 2,372 2,392 2,200 2,109 2,033 17,421 
Number of firms with 
ineffective internal control 313 303 239 217 120 72 64 83 1,411 
Percentage of firms with 
ineffective internal control 
(%) 
17.77 13.52 10.33 9.15 5.02 3.27 3.03 4.08 8.10 
This table presents the sample selection process and the number and percentage of firm-years with 






Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Firm efficiency by industry 
 # of obs Mean STD Q1  Median Q3 
All firms 17,421 0.374 0.246 0.152 0.353 0.570 
       
Agriculture 66 0.372 0.147 0.245 0.367 0.485 
Food 227 0.664 0.098 0.592 0.634 0.717 
Soda 27 0.818 0.127 0.765 0.817 0.947 
Beer and Liquor 36 0.854 0.089 0.759 0.878 0.947 
Smoking 43 0.690 0.258 0.653 0.760 0.834 
Toys 98 0.623 0.082 0.575 0.623 0.674 
Fun 287 0.125 0.089 0.091 0.107 0.126 
Books 138 0.494 0.175 0.377 0.459 0.544 
Household Products 262 0.531 0.116 0.450 0.519 0.582 
Clothing 179 0.750 0.077 0.701 0.736 0.798 
Health 437 0.481 0.127 0.364 0.468 0.564 
Medical Equipment 684 0.470 0.144 0.420 0.474 0.539 
Drugs 1,655 0.160 0.139 0.034 0.131 0.265 
Chemicals 517 0.493 0.110 0.421 0.472 0.544 
Rubber 106 0.809 0.058 0.772 0.803 0.831 
Textiles 28 0.855 0.049 0.821 0.845 0.878 
Building Materials 289 0.650 0.105 0.608 0.662 0.704 
Construction 286 0.604 0.120 0.541 0.616 0.675 
Steel 335 0.608 0.094 0.546 0.589 0.653 
Fabricated Products 49 0.873 0.067 0.837 0.868 0.942 
Machinery 662 0.548 0.083 0.504 0.537 0.585 
Electrical Equipment 336 0.509 0.159 0.464 0.554 0.607 
Utilities 143 0.407 0.126 0.376 0.421 0.467 
Automobiles 328 0.788 0.113 0.747 0.793 0.842 
Aerospace 106 0.782 0.068 0.735 0.766 0.806 
Ships 56 0.878 0.075 0.844 0.889 0.940 
Guns 57 0.837 0.121 0.750 0.875 0.947 
Gold 101 0.107 0.043 0.088 0.102 0.129 
Mining 129 0.178 0.082 0.128 0.176 0.220 
Coal 95 0.670 0.143 0.604 0.662 0.740 
Energy 1,152 0.183 0.105 0.113 0.162 0.239 
Telecom 824 0.495 0.119 0.444 0.493 0.550 
Personal Services 270 0.577 0.149 0.488 0.571 0.650 
Business Services 2,667 0.156 0.069 0.131 0.144 0.168 
Computers 757 0.372 0.125 0.304 0.360 0.435 
Chips 1,190 0.313 0.159 0.194 0.277 0.415 
Laboratory Equipment 405 0.577 0.110 0.536 0.584 0.633 
Paper 249 0.741 0.067 0.698 0.732 0.778 
Boxes 75 0.852 0.091 0.820 0.859 0.892 
Transportation 785 0.269 0.113 0.207 0.230 0.283 
Wholesale 575 0.012 0.025 0.003 0.006 0.011 
Retail 559 0.663 0.081 0.606 0.657 0.715 






Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Firm efficiency over time 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Total number of firm-years 1,761 2,241 2,313 2,372 2,392 2,200 2,109 2,033 17,421 
Mean Efficiency 0.357 0.378 0.371 0.371 0.379 0.364 0.385 0.390 0.374 
# of firms with Efficiency = 1  5 12 10 12 13 8 11 15 86 
Percentage of firms with 
Efficiency = 1 (%) 





Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Firm efficiency and control variables by internal control effectiveness 
  Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Firm-years with ineffective internal control  (n= 1,411) 
 EFFICIENCY 0.350 0.236 0.143 0.299 0.538 
 LOG_TA 5.985 1.541 4.971 5.841 6.914 
 MRTSHARE 0.381 1.138 0.017 0.061 0.266 
 FCF 0.147 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 LOG_AGE 2.721 0.606 2.303 2.639 3.091 
 CONCENTRATION 0.835 0.285 0.574 1.000 1.000 
 FOREIGN 0.381 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 LOSS 0.543 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 INVENTORY 0.089 0.113 0.000 0.041 0.142 
 SEGMENTS 4.079 2.932 2.000 3.000 5.000 
 MERGER 0.437 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 RESTRUCTURE 0.369 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 LITIGATION 0.374 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 EXTREME_GROWTH 0.196 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BIG4 0.717 0.451 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 AUD_CHANGE 0.135 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Firm-years with effective internal control  (n= 16,010) 
 EFFICIENCY 0.377 0.247 0.153 0.355 0.572 
 LOG_TA 6.678 1.764 5.396 6.560 7.837 
 MRTSHARE 0.971 2.447 0.026 0.121 0.575 
 FCF 0.243 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 LOG_AGE 2.862 0.637 2.398 2.773 3.296 
 CONCENTRATION 0.837 0.281 0.604 1.000 1.000 
 FOREIGN 0.354 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 LOSS 0.396 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 INVENTORY 0.088 0.112 0.001 0.047 0.136 
 SEGMENTS 4.044 2.872 2.000 3.000 5.000 
 MERGER 0.457 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 RESTRUCTURE 0.326 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 LITIGATION 0.344 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 EXTREME_GROWTH 0.161 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BIG4 0.850 0.357 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 AUD_CHANGE 0.045 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.000 
45 
 
Table 2 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Pairwise correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 EFFICIENCY  -0.03 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.19 -0.13 0.04 -0.24 0.37 0.14 0.07 0.07 -0.31 0.02 0.05 -0.01 
2 ICMW -0.03  -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.11 
3 LOG_TA 0.21 -0.11  0.52 0.11 0.36 -0.23 0.15 -0.31 0.01 0.30 0.25 0.22 -0.26 -0.12 0.37 -0.08 
4 MKTSHARE 0.45 -0.08 0.76  0.08 0.29 -0.17 0.06 -0.16 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.15 -0.18 -0.07 0.15 -0.04 
5 FCF 0.12 -0.06 0.10 0.16  0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.22 0.01 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 
6 LOG_AGE 0.19 -0.06 0.32 0.39 0.09  -0.24 0.06 -0.18 0.21 0.22 0.07 0.17 -0.19 -0.20 0.07 -0.03 
7 CONCENTRATION -0.16 0.00 -0.24 -0.28 -0.01 -0.24  -0.07 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 -0.16 -0.13 0.14 0.07 -0.07 0.01 
8 FOREIGN 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.06 -0.06  -0.04 0.04 0.36 0.08 0.16 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.00 
9 LOSS -0.25 0.08 -0.31 -0.35 -0.22 -0.18 0.13 -0.04  -0.11 -0.09 -0.22 0.08 0.17 0.08 -0.10 0.03 
10 INVENTORY 0.46 0.00 0.09 0.35 0.05 0.29 -0.15 0.12 -0.13  0.14 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
11 SEGMENTS 0.18 0.00 0.30 0.34 0.08 0.23 -0.10 0.42 -0.11 0.26  0.11 0.19 -0.05 -0.08 0.12 -0.01 
12 MERGER 0.08 -0.01 0.26 0.25 0.03 0.06 -0.18 0.08 -0.22 0.01 0.15  0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.02 
13 RESTRUCTURE 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.24 -0.01 0.16 -0.12 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.23 0.10  0.03 -0.13 0.13 -0.01 
14 LITIGATION -0.30 0.02 -0.27 -0.39 0.00 -0.18 0.16 0.02 0.17 -0.16 -0.03 -0.04 0.03  0.03 -0.03 0.00 
15 EXTREME_GROWTH 0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.06 -0.20 0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.13 0.03  -0.08 0.02 
16 BIG4 0.06 -0.10 0.38 0.31 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.15 0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.08  -0.16 
17 AUD_CHANGE -0.01 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.16   
This table reports descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation coefficients for variables used in the study. See Appendix B for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel A reports the operational efficiency by the Fama and French 
(1997) industry classification. Panel B reports the mean firm efficiency, and the number and percentage of firms on the efficient frontier by year. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics on firm efficiency and control variables for firm-years with internal control material weaknesses (ICMW=1) 
and those without (ICMW=0). The variables for which the group of ineffective internal control is different from the group of effective internal 
control at 5% significant level are presented in boldface. Differences in means (medians) are tests using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Panel D 





Table 3 Internal control effectiveness and firm operational efficiency 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
ICMW (H1: –)  -0.011 0.001  -0.007 0.003 
LOG_TA  0.015 0.000  0.014 0.000 
MKTSHARE  -0.003 0.002  -0.003 0.003 
FCF  0.076 0.000  0.064 0.000 
LOG_AGE  -0.011 0.001  -0.011 0.000 
CONCENTRATION  0.008 0.066  0.008 0.038 
FOREIGN  0.004 0.195  0.004 0.169 
LOSS    
 -0.049 0.000 
INVENTORY    
 0.095 0.000 
SEGMENTS    
 0.000 0.489 
MERGER    
 0.005 0.012 
RESTRUCTURE    
 -0.017 0.000 
LITIGATION    
 0.007 0.141 
EXTREME_GROWTH    
 0.021 0.000 
BIG4    
 -0.007 0.160 
AUD_CHANGE    






INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS  Yes  Yes 
N  17,421  17,421 
Adjusted R2  0.8185  0.8304 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of firm operational efficiency on ICMW and control 
variables. See Appendix B for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. All p-values are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering, and 




Table 4 Cross-sectional analyses on the relation between internal control 
effectiveness and firm operational efficiency 
 
Panel A: Ease of misappropriation of corporate resources  
 
  LIQUID (1) 
 GEO_SEGMENTS 
(2) 
  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
ICMW  0.004 0.690  0.002 0.773 
ICMW × LIQUID (H2: –)  -0.020 0.141    
ICMW × GEO_SEGMENTS (H2: –)     -0.019 0.060 
LIQUID  0.018 0.001    
GEO_SEGMENTS     0.014 0.005 
LOG_TA  0.015 0.000  0.013 0.000 
MKTSHARE  -0.003 0.001  -0.003 0.004 
FCF  0.063 0.000  0.064 0.000 
LOG_AGE  -0.012 0.000  -0.012 0.000 
CONCENTRATION  0.008 0.052  0.009 0.018 
FOREIGN  0.003 0.282  0.003 0.392 
LOSS  -0.049 0.000  -0.049 0.000 
INVENTORY  0.083 0.000  0.094 0.000 
SEGMENTS  0.000 0.597    
MERGER  0.006 0.002  0.005 0.017 
RESTRUCTURE  -0.017 0.000  -0.017 0.000 
LITIGATION  0.006 0.226  0.006 0.226 
EXTREME_GROWTH  0.020 0.000  0.021 0.000 
BIG4  -0.009 0.101  -0.007 0.160 






INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS  Yes  Yes 
N  17,421  17,421 





Table 4 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Demand for higher quality internal reports for decision making  
 





 Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
ICMW 0.007 0.376  0.011 0.173  0.008 0.409 
ICMW × OCFVOL (H3: –) -0.025 0.043       
ICMW × AF_ERROR (H3: –)    -0.026 0.010    
ICMW × OPACITY (H3: –)       -0.018 0.077 
OCFVOL 0.005 0.319       
AF_ERROR    -0.010 0.005    
OPACITY       0.000 0.982 
LOG_TA 0.014 0.000  0.013 0.000  0.012 0.000 
MKTSHARE -0.003 0.004  -0.003 0.003  -0.002 0.006 
FCF 0.064 0.000  0.064 0.000  0.061 0.000 
LOG_AGE -0.011 0.000  -0.011 0.000  -0.011 0.000 
CONCENTRATION 0.008 0.036  0.008 0.043  0.006 0.167 
FOREIGN 0.004 0.195  0.005 0.129  0.005 0.147 
LOSS -0.049 0.000  -0.048 0.000  -0.047 0.000 
INVENTORY 0.093 0.000  0.099 0.000  0.083 0.000 
SEGMENTS 0.000 0.472  0.000 0.484  0.000 0.590 
MERGER 0.005 0.008  0.005 0.021  0.004 0.082 
RESTRUCTURE -0.017 0.000  -0.016 0.000  -0.017 0.000 
LITIGATION 0.007 0.148  0.007 0.180  0.005 0.309 
EXTREME_GROWTH 0.020 0.000  0.021 0.000  0.019 0.000 
BIG4 -0.008 0.132  -0.008 0.114  -0.015 0.001 
AUD_CHANGE -0.002 0.549  -0.001 0.731  -0.001 0.829 





INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 17,332  17,421  14,854 
Adjusted R2 0.8307  0.8307  0.8431 
This table reports the OLS regression results from cross-sectional analyses of the relation between 
internal control effectiveness and operational efficiency. Panels A and B present the results in which the 
cross-sectional variables proxy for the ease of misappropriation of corporate resources and the demand for 
higher quality internal reports for decision making, respectively. See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, except for the cross-sectional 
variables, which are the standardized decile ranks within industries. All p-values are computed using the 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and year, and are based on two-tailed tests except for the 






Table 5 Internal control effectiveness and firm operational efficiency – 
Change analysis 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
INTERCEPT  -0.004 0.110  -0.003 0.194 
∆ICMW (H1: –)  -0.006 0.008    
IC_WORSE (H1: –)     -0.009 0.023 
IC_BETTER (H1: +)     0.003 0.007 
∆LOG_TA  0.027 0.000  0.028 0.000 
∆MKTSHARE  0.022 0.148  0.022 0.149 
∆FCF  0.012 0.036  0.012 0.035 






INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS  No  No 
N  3,675  3,675 
Adjusted R2  0.0300  0.0301 
This table reports the OLS regression results of the changes in firm operational efficiency on changes in 
internal control effectiveness. ΔICMW is the change in internal control material weakness dummy from 
year t-1 to t. IC_WORSE is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports no material 
weaknesses in year t-1 but reports material weaknesses in year t, zero otherwise. IC_BETTER is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports material weakness in year t-1 but reports no material 
weaknesses in year t, zero otherwise. The dependent variable ΔEFFICIENCY refers to the changes in 
operational efficiency from t-1 to t. The other explanatory variables are also measured as the changes 
from year t-1 to year t. See Appendix B for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. All p-values are computed using the standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
firm and year, and are based on two-tailed tests except for ∆ICMW, IC_WORSE, and IC_BETTER, which 




Table 6 Internal control effectiveness and firm operational efficiency by firm 
size 
 
 MVE (1) 
 D_75million  
(2) 
 D_250million  
(3) 
 D_75-250million  
(4) 
 Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
ICMW -0.014 0.022  -0.006 0.031  -0.002 0.477  -0.002 0.451 
ICMW × MVE 0.019 0.072          
ICMW × D_75million    -0.023 0.166     -0.027 0.138 
ICMW × D_250million       -0.010 0.078    
ICMW × D_75-250million          -0.009 0.097 
MVE 0.041 0.000          
D_75million    -0.027 0.000     -0.032 0.000 
D_250million       -0.010 0.002    
D_75-250million          -0.007 0.032 
LOG_TA    0.013 0.000  0.012 0.000  0.012 0.000 
MKTSHARE -0.001 0.586  -0.003 0.009  -0.002 0.016  -0.002 0.019 
FCF 0.062 0.000  0.064 0.000  0.063 0.000  0.063 0.000 
LOG_AGE -0.009 0.002  -0.011 0.000  -0.011 0.000  -0.011 0.000 
CONCENTRATION 0.005 0.252  0.008 0.038  0.008 0.047  0.008 0.043 
FOREIGN 0.006 0.070  0.004 0.205  0.004 0.200  0.004 0.201 
LOSS -0.049 0.000  -0.048 0.000  -0.048 0.000  -0.047 0.000 
INVENTORY 0.098 0.000  0.096 0.000  0.096 0.000  0.097 0.000 
SEGMENTS 0.001 0.135  0.001 0.424  0.001 0.407  0.001 0.410 
MERGER 0.008 0.000  0.005 0.008  0.006 0.006  0.005 0.009 
RESTRUCTURE -0.012 0.000  -0.016 0.000  -0.016 0.000  -0.016 0.000 
LITIGATION 0.002 0.643  0.006 0.213  0.006 0.221  0.006 0.226 
EXTREME_GROWTH 0.018 0.000  0.019 0.000  0.019 0.000  0.019 0.000 
BIG4 -0.002 0.724  -0.008 0.118  -0.009 0.088  -0.009 0.077 
AUD_CHANGE -0.001 0.665  -0.001 0.650  -0.001 0.702  -0.001 0.708 
   





 Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 17,164  17,164  17,164  17,164 
Adjusted R2 0.8297  0.8320  0.8317  0.8321 
This table reports the cross-sectional results on the effect of internal control effectiveness on operational 
efficiency by firm size. In Column (1), MVE is the market value of equity. In Columns (2) and (3), 
D_75million and D_250million are indicator variables for small firms, where D_75million and 
D_250million are set to one for firms whose market capitalization is below $75 million and below $250 
million, respectively, and zero otherwise. In Column (4), D_75-250million is an indicator variable that 
equals one for firms with market capitalization between $75 million and $250 million. See Appendix B 
for the definition of other variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
except for MVE, which is the standardized decile ranks within industries. All p-values are computed using 
51 
 
the standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and year, and are based on two-tailed tests except for 
the interaction terms, which are based on one-tailed tests.  
52 
 
Table 7 Market reaction to the disclosure of material weaknesses  
 
 CAR_1 (Size-adjusted return) 
 CAR_2 
(Market-adjusted return) 
 Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. 
ICMW -0.017 0.022  -0.016 0.027 
ICMW × CAR 0.024 0.013  0.023 0.016 
LOG_TA 0.013 0.000  0.013 0.000 
MKTSHARE -0.003 0.004  -0.003 0.004 
FCF 0.064 0.000  0.064 0.000 
LOG_AGE -0.012 0.000  -0.012 0.000 
CONCENTRATION 0.008 0.039  0.008 0.038 
FOREIGN 0.004 0.166  0.004 0.165 
LOSS -0.049 0.000  -0.049 0.000 
INVENTORY 0.093 0.000  0.093 0.000 
SEGMENTS 0.000 0.509  0.000 0.512 
MERGER 0.005 0.012  0.005 0.012 
RESTRUCTURE -0.016 0.000  -0.016 0.000 
LITIGATION 0.007 0.167  0.007 0.169 
EXTREME_GROWTH 0.020 0.000  0.020 0.000 
BIG4 -0.009 0.075  -0.009 0.075 
AUD_CHANGE -0.002 0.550  -0.002 0.545 
   
 
  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Yes  Yes 
N 17,256  17,256 
Adjusted R2 0.8314  0.8314 
This table reports the cross-sectional results on the effect of internal control effectiveness on operational 
efficiency by the market reaction to the disclosure of material weaknesses. Specifically, we regress 
operation efficiency in year t on the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over a three-day window 
centered on the filing date of 10-K that reports an ineffective internal control and other control variables, 
where CAR_1 is the sized-adjusted returns and CAR_2 is the market-adjusted returns. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All p-values are 
computed using the standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and year, and are based on two-tailed 




Table 8 Operating performance subsequent to the disclosure of material 
weaknesses 
 
     Panel A:  Firms with material weaknesses in year t 
  t+1 t+2 
No remediation in year t+1    
Mean  -3.2% -8.6% 
(p-value)  (0.005) (0.003) 
Median  -0.1% -5.0% 
(p-value)  (0.006) (0.000) 
N  325 124 
Remediation in year t+1    
Mean  -0.6% 1.4% 
(p-value)  (0.431) (0.199) 
Median  -0.1% -0.4% 
(p-value)  (0.156) (0.802) 
N  635 485 
 
     Panel B:  Firms that remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1 
  t+1 t+2 
With improvement in operational efficiency    
Mean  2.4% 5.0% 
(p-value)  (0.010) (0.000) 
Median  0.8% 1.3% 
(p-value)  (0.005) (0.001) 
N  341 266 
Without improvement in operational efficiency    
Mean  -4.1% -3.1% 
(p-value)  (0.001) (0.068) 
Median  -3.0% -1.8% 
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.004) 
N  294 219 
This table reports the abnormal operating performance for firms with material weaknesses in year t for 
subsequent years t+1 and t+2, where year t is the year of disclosure of material weaknesses. Abnormal 
return on assets (ROA) is calculated based on a matched-firm approach, as suggested by Barber and 
Lyon (1996), where the matched firm is the firm in the same industry (Fama-French industry 
classification) with ROA closest to that of a firm with material weaknesses in year t. Panel A reports 
the future operating performance of firms with material weaknesses depending on whether or not firms 
remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1. Panel B shows the future operating performance for 
firms that remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1 depending on whether they improve their 
operational efficiency from t to t+1 (or from t to t+2). Two-sided p-values are based on t-statistics for 




Table 9 Stock performance subsequent to the disclosure of material 
weaknesses 
 
     Panel A:  Firms with material weaknesses in year t 
  t+1 t+2 
No remediation in year t+1    
Mean  -10.0% -12.5% 
(p-value)  (0.007) (0.145) 
Median  -11.4% -20.2% 
(p-value)  (0.001) (0.008) 
N  316 103 
Remediation in year t+1    
Mean  -2.3% 5.7% 
(p-value)  (0.382) (0.136) 
Median  -4.6% 4.3% 
(p-value)  (0.045) (0.317) 
N  648 492 
 
     Panel B:  Firms that remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1 
  t+1 t+2 
With improvement in operational efficiency    
Mean  8.5% 7.4% 
(p-value)  (0.021) (0.139) 
Median  4.5% 6.3% 
(p-value)  (0.130) (0.405) 
N  346 270 
Without improvement in operational efficiency    
Mean  -14.6% 3.6% 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (0.541) 
Median  -14.7% 0.7% 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (0.601) 
N  302 222 
This table reports the abnormal stock performance for firms with material weaknesses in year t for 
subsequent years t+1 and t+2 where year t is the year of disclosure of material weaknesses. Abnormal 
stock return are calculated based on a matched-firm approach, as suggested by Barber and Lyon 
(1996), where the matched firm is the firm in the same industry (Fama-French industry classification) 
with the buy-and-hold return closest to that of a firm with material weaknesses in year t. Panel A 
reports the future stock performance of firms with material weaknesses depending on whether or not 
firms remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1. Panel B shows the future stock performance for 
firms that remediate their material weaknesses in year t+1 depending on whether they improve their 
operational efficiency from t to t+1 (or from t to t+2). Two-sided p-values are based on t-statistics for 
the differences in means and Wilcoxon signed tests for the differences in medians.   
